In the lab, of course, it's less of a problem. So the rat can come to learn that the information about the lever means food, because it does; the higher order event structure is actually there to support this, in the same way time-to-contact means what it does.
Sabrina, I wish I had better terms to suggest. The problem is worse than the boundary being fuzzy. I am also very sensitive to the 'getting past editors' issue. In a recent past-life, I was a non-representational developmental psychologist. Yes, ecological psychologists must 'branch out' and it is difficult. It is problematic that, after all this time, there are not more ecological psychologists on the editorial boards of major journals, at grant funding agencies, etc.
In part I blame the overly adversarial attitude that perhaps necessarily characterized the early development of the field. I'm skipping the second point, I know, but the quest for a coherent behaviorism is a much longer discussion.
Certainly, though, a good behaviorist should be as averse to metaphorical representation-talk as any ecological psychologist. My comments were purely about the framing. Perception-independent experience. There are still proper behaviourists out there - I work in the area of contemporary learning theories, not behaviourism - this is important to some people ; now to a couple of the points raised above: 2 I'm not sure about the 'association' vs.
As I understand it, Eco-Psych doesn't go beyond a simple SR approach to explain conditioning though, and there are several well established learning phenomena that don't fit that.
Pair a tone and a light. Then pair light and food. The animal will respond to the tone, as if it had been paired with food. They also are able to flexibly alter their behaviour, when they need to - and its this that I struggle to see how eco-psych explains. By what process does this happen? It sounds a little like magic to me? One of the things I like about your approach is the parsimony - but when it becomes overly descriptive I struggle, because I can't see how this is a more parsimonious approach than one that invokes representations.
Sorry this isn't quite as coherent as it might be Eric said: One of the big lessons from 'pragmatism' is that there is no clear line between different cognitive phenomena Which motivates my general posture - attempting to reduce behavior to pure responsive action, possibly along the lines of Rorty's reduction of phil of language to "pure Davidsonian semantics" not to suggest that I am totally clear on what he means by that.
Here, that leads to an attempt to reduce, if not eliminate, the role of the "food" concept. Note that I stop my description of the rat's behavior at "ingestible", by which I mean only "swallowable". I see the rat as having learned to respond to the tone by executing a composite action that often leads to that affordance. If an object offering that affordance is thereby reached, whether it is "edible" seems a separable issues.
In fact, I don't even consider that an affordance. It's approaching noon, so I head for the kitchen - not because I'm salivating but because my watch is offering read-time-from-able.
I'm just executing a "stored" procedure that may or may not result in access to any food. My wife does the shopping, so I often have no idea which it will be. And she might find the analogy apt in other respects! On to networks.
Although "reverberation" seems to be on the right track, a better term might be "resonance". One can envision Sabrina's perceptual network as constituting an adaptive filter bank. The learning process would be to "grow" the filter bank so that a new member would pass a specific perceived input signal ie, the neural activity consequent to sensory input. Then in a sense to be described, part of the filter bank would become "resonant with" that signal. The output from a specific filter would excite a part of the network that would activate motor neurons that in turn initiate an appropriate responsive action.
There are several features of Sabrina's network view that make it a much better way of thinking about what I had in mind by "progressive pattern matching". It is inherently continuous; it provides a natural connection between sensory input and motor output; which in turn creates the feedback loop needed for adaptive behavior, eg, smooth tracking; and finally, it eliminates the need for precise "pattern matching". A so-called "matched filter" can be thought of as doing a correlation between the received signal and a stored version of a signal to be detected.
But such a filter will respond - "resonate" - to any input signal that isn't "too far removed" from the signal to which it is matched. The response will be attenuated relative to the response of the matched signal, but can still activate a response that is "good enough". This view also arguably works with dreams. A matched filter can resonate in response to signals that have no meaningful relationship to the signal to which it is matched.
Thus, dreams could result from outputs of the filter bank due to arbitrary inputs AKA, "noise" spontaneously generated in the sensory input path. Usually, the responses would not be actualized as motion, although some can be - talking in one's sleep and, in extreme cases, sleepwalking. I agree that "stored response" is a poor way of describing the process and didn't mean to suggest that the system has no adaptive aspect. In any event, since Sabrina's filter view arguably responds even to inputs that "aren't quite right" and incorporates feedback, that issue more-or-less goes away.
Pam, As I read Gibson, he is agnostic about most of the core issues of behaviorism. He had opinions to be sure, as he was mentored by one of the greatest of the early behaviorists or at least Holt was so known in his day , and his system assumed a great deal of what behaviorist have always arguing for, but he chose not to make that his fight.
Gibson wanted to know how we perceived things, and thought perception was intimately related to action, but he offered no theory about why animals sometimes act one way and other times act differently. On the other hand, learning theory is primarily about why organisms act one way sometimes and other ways other times. Though I don't know quite how to pull off the magic, I am convinced that the approaches are complementary, rather than adversarial.
You are right though, that some of the most influential ecological psychologists e. Though they would never admit that this is what they have offered, they have, and you are also correct that it is problematic. As a side note to this from Charles, one of my favourite things that I know about dreaming is that the motor system from the neck down is very actively inhibited during dreaming, and failures of this inhibition are often disastrous because the behaviour isn't connected to the world I don't think sleepwalking occurs during REM.
Evolution clearly noticed it was important to utterly lock down a system, and it always makes me realise how important good access to information is. The other cool thing I know about sleep is that dolphins sleep one hemisphere at a time, so they can continue to move in the water safely under active control.
I draw similar conclusions there too :. Pam - Sorry, but I'm not familiar with the relevant lingo. Could you elaborate "Pair a tone and a light"? I assume "pair a light and food" means training the subject to take an action when a light event occurs, an action that will result in access to food.
But it's not obvious to me how to adapt that description to "pair a tone and light". I'm back to being confused about how purposes or goals enter the picture, so I have no answer. Maybe it is by magic! Charles, To "pair a light and food" means to present them at the same time typically one presents the light immediately before the food. Pam is pointing out that her original claim was about "classical condition" Pavlovian drooling-dog stuff rather than "operant conditioning" Skinnerian rat-pressing-lever stuff.
To be more specific, if you are "pairing" then the behavior of the organism does NOT cause the outcome. As for purposes or goals, this is a problematic discussion. A rat that works to press a lever is a rat that want's to press a lever. I don't know about Rorty, but Peirce would agree. The behaviorists built a science about how a rat that does not want to do certain thing becomes a rat that does want to do certain things. Alas, with a few notable exceptions, they eschewed the words 'want' or 'purpose'.
Note, I once again cheated by switching to an operant situation. This has lead to all sorts of confusion, for example, you will not find learning theory mentioned in an introductory psychology textbook's chapter on motivation. So put rat in skinner box. Eric and Pam - Thanks for the explanation. I of course have a top level idea about how conditioning works, but no idea at all what the detailed procedures are like. Those responses help a lot.
So, what about the following. Suppose Sabrina's perceptual network is more or less accurately modeled by a filter bank. Then one can hypothesize that the learning process that pairs tone and light causes the simultaneous "growth" in the network of light and tone "matched filters" that are effectively in parallel but which have no output, ie, no connections to motor neurons, Then in the learning process that pairs tone and food, the resulting output connections might be shared by default by the two filters so that their sensory neuronal inputs are effectively logically "OR"ed with respect to producing a common motor neuronal output.
That seems to produce the observed behavior as I understand it. If I'm right in guessing that a relevant behavior included in "specific satiety effects" is the subject's not responding to the tone when not hungry, that seems straightforward as well at least in the simplistic model.
Being hungry is the kind of input included when you "expand[] the 'perceptual' network to include all stimuli whether from perceptions or from internal sources such as emotions and memories".
Hunger would simply be an input to the network that could in principle be used to gate the parallel tone and light matched filters - or their inputs - on and off. Hi Charles - not sure what you mean by a filter bank - but what you are describing sounds a little to me like an associative model! There are two types of satiety effect - one is the reduction in response when not hungry, and one is the reduction in response when sated on a specific reward.
So if a tone predicts sucrose solution, and a light predicts a savory food pellet, when the rat has had access to the sucrose solution for an hour before a test session which is conducted with no rewards present , it will continue to respond during the light, but will no longer respond during the tone. That seems to require something more sophisticated than a hunger 'gate'.
It involves encoding the current value of the reward is it still rewarding? A similar experiment can look at learning about flavours. Animals are given a drinking tube of salty vanilla water, say 10 mls a day, for 4 days.
They are also given a tube at a different time of day of 10ml of almond flavoured water. They will then choose to drink vanilla no salt present water more than almond water. I agree that our approaches can be complimentary - and I'm tremendously enjoying trying to get my head around your approach. Incidentally, I came across a lovely example similar to the steam governor - my son has built a maplin electronics kit to make a 'bug' that follows light.
So when the light shines, that turns on the motor on that side, making the bug move towards the light. No "representation" required, but if you stuck in an electrode, you might interpret the electric signal as a representation. Food for thought re. Pam, those robot kits were probably inspired by some robotics work by Pfifer and Scheier link to their book done explicitly to show you could get complex behaviour emerging from simple systems embodied in particular ways.
You should try adjusting the spacing between the sensors, you'll get interesting changes in behaviour with no change to the 'neural' control system! In the absence of light, it just idles.
When a light source appears, the wheels are enabled and the device tracks the light source. Ie, it has "light-light location" pairing by design. Add a pair of "TDRs" that cause analogous behavior with respect to a tone source, and the device then has "tone-tone location" pairing as well again, by design.
In essence, the device's "brain" or network becomes a two element "filter bank" that responds differentially to sensory inputs. Its input signal can be either an aural frequency or a visual frequency and the output of the filter that "resonates" drives the wheel motors so as to track the active source. Now imagine that the device is "smart" enough to learn a drive pattern for the wheels that causes the device to move from a fixed location to the location of the light source now assumed to be fixed as well.
Then the device can be rewired so that the tone activates both the wheels and the learned drive pattern. Thus the perception changes from person to person.
Perception is also shaped by the person's learning, memory, expectation and attention. Perception is understanding of something experienced through the senses like for an example through hearing ear about a person, the mind can change the perception or the image based on whatever was earlier heard.
Eg: I thought XYZ is a good school, but when I heard about their latest scandal, I will re-think about the admission in the school. So, this means that the person's perception about the school was changed after hearing about a certain scandal related to the school.
The original image of the school was good because that person was thinking to get enrolled in that school, but later changed the mind because of certain knowledge about school. All perception involves signal that goes to the person's nervous system , that results in chemical or physical stimulation of the sensory system. For example, vision involves light striking the retina of the eye or hearing involves pressure waves. Perception are often based on feelings, intuitions, dreams, analysis, discussions and sometimes may not result more than awareness.
In simple terms conception means a mental image or idea of something formed in the mind of a person. This means the way a person represents something mentally. The word Conceive has many several meanings like comprehending, a collection, a composition, an expression and also becoming pregnant from Concipio, which is past participle of Conceptus conceive. The singular is Conception and plural form is conceptions. Different meaning to the terms conceive are:.
Conception involves an internal process of thoughts that produces new results or ideas. Like the inventions , they are mainly conceptions which has certain level of value to the world through sharing or commerce and technology.
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Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5 , 3— Download references. You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar. Liz Swan and Andrew Winters gave me very helpful comments on earlier versions of the work. I am very grateful to them. Reprints and Permissions. Bueno, O. Perception and Conception: Shaping Human Minds. Biosemiotics 6, — Download citation. Received : 21 September Accepted : 15 November Published : 26 February Issue Date : December Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:.
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Skip to main content. Search SpringerLink Search. Abstract Perceptual experiences provide an important source of information about the world. Notes 1. This explains how our conceptual capacities are significantly unbounded. References Azzouni, J.
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